End of organised atheism. The genealogy of the law on freedom of conscience and its conceptual effects in Russia by Oustinova-Stjepanovic, Galina
 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of organised atheism. The genealogy of the law on freedom
of conscience and its conceptual effects in Russia
Citation for published version:
Oustinova-Stjepanovic, G 2019, 'End of organised atheism. The genealogy of the law on freedom of
conscience and its conceptual effects in Russia', History and Anthropology.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02757206.2019.1684271
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/02757206.2019.1684271
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
History and Anthropology
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in History and Anthropology on 11
November 2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02757206.2019.1684271
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Nov. 2020
1 
 
End of organized atheism. The genealogy of the Russian law on freedom of conscience and its 
conceptual effects. 
Biblioglobus is a dim-lit, overcrowded bookshop opposite the former KGB (now FSB) 
headquarters on the Lubyanka Square. The shop itself is a narrow maze with books fading in 
the darkness and unexpected doors and staircases leading to other levels and smoking 
courtyards. Lubyanka itself is a site of historical memory of Stalin’s executions, and present-
day commemorations of atrocity. To me, the choice of this venue for a book launch of a new 
publication on the history of European and Russian atheist thought seemed laden with 
political subversion. Set out of sight in the basement, the event conveyed an aura of a 
clandestine underground activity, an impression reinforced by comparison with the central 
bookshop on Arbat Street that tends to broadcast book presentations through a system of 
loudspeakers. The event gathered approximately 20 middle-aged and elderly people. After 
conventional acknowledgements and applause, the microphone was handed to the author, 
who was introduced as a militant atheist, Marxist, constitutionalist, and lecturer at a military 
academy. Nikolaii scrambled to his feet, apologised for the stage nerves, and commenced his 
somewhat incoherent presentationii: 
“Thank you! In the sea of theological literature, this book is a surge (vsplesk) of free-thinking.  It stands 
for critique of the acting [state] power (kritika deistvuuschei vlasti). Marx, whom we didn’t understand, has 
argued that all critique starts with critique of religion. First, I need to mention violations of the constitution… My 
friend’s father […] was attacked by an Islamist. Putin is unable to guarantee constitutional rights. I tried to attend 
a theological conference […], but was denied access. A colleague, who is a lawyer, rightly pointed out that it was 
a violation of the rights of an unbeliever… Russia has asked Ukraine to shut down a website that uploaded an 
article about Islam because Russia deems it to be extremist. What is this about? Today, we can’t criticize religion. 
But we live in a democratic state and have laws compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights. We 
have the right to criticize. We have chaplains in the army! There is a real threat of Orthodox chauvinism! My 
association [that promotes secularism and humanism] was established 5 years ago. We are constitutionalists. 
Our political principles are separation of the church and the state, respect for human rights, a scientific 
worldview, critical thinking. In Moscow, one cannot walk for armed Muslims, they are all radicalized. They don’t 
know anything about Islamic scholars [Nikolai referenced a long list of names]. We should preserve the 
constitutional secularism. The Russian Orthodox Church is the instrument of repression of national protest 
(natsionalnii protest). We have to realize freedom of conscience. The state has failed to protect it…” 
The next speaker was an elderly female scholar who reviewed Nikolai’s book and 
contributed a few pages of recollections about atheists in the Soviet academia. In contrast to 
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Nikolai’s belligerent tone, she softly explained to the audience that “atheism is the highest 
form of freedom”. “In Russia,” she said, “religious freedom is subsumed in a broader category 
of freedom of conscience, which encourages all forms of free-thinking…”  
Two more speakers voiced their opposition to the clericalization of the state and 
expressed concern about radicalised Islam. Finally, Nikolai resumed the floor: “We need to 
stop the clericalization of the nation. We have the right to freedom of conscience and the 
right to criticize”. 
The event ended swiftly and unexceptionally. However, my curiosity was piqued by 
Nikolai’s explicit connection between atheism as a political right to criticise the state and the 
Church and his demand for the right to freedom of conscience. The essay explores this 
ethnographic connection through a lens of the genealogy of the Russian law on freedom of 
conscience and its conceptual lineaments, namely the historically intertwined categories of 
atheism, right and conscience and their relevance for understanding atheist activism in Russia 
as a gesture of incipient political dissent.  
Rather than raising theological questions about being and “thinking without God” 
(Watkin 2011:1), a version of atheism propagated by Nikolai and other atheist activists I met 
in Moscow in 2017-2018 constitutes a political claim to the right to critical thinking coupled 
with a call for juridical equality between religion and atheism in relation to the law on freedom 
of conscience. At the same time, Nikolai’s polemic reminds of the language of the Soviet 
constitutional rights activists and dissidents who publicly challenged the Soviet party-state to 
respect and realize its own constitution (Boobbyer 2005; Nathans 2007). Indeed, in merging 
his atheist denunciation of clericalization of the state with the diatribe against the ineffectual 
state, Nikolai has posited atheism as an intellectual and political alternative to the ideologies 
of the state and the church. It also conveyed a pervasive sense of marginality and exclusion 
among Muscovite atheists.  
It is remarkable since, in everyday life, many Russian people self-identify as atheists, 
agnostics, the unchurched, or simply disinterested. However, since a series of juridical 
reforms and a recent rebranding of the Pan-Soviet Znanie organization from the Soviet 
champion for enlightenment and atheist education into a promoter of traditional values and 
Russian patriotism, Russian atheist activists do not have an institutional platform for their 
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activities. While I am interested in the phenomenology of the loss of power and juridical 
marginality of contemporary atheist activists in Moscow, this essay sets to explicate how legal 
reforms have led to the loss of power and Soviet atheists’ privileges after the dissolution of 
the Soviet state.  
Through a mixed methodology of archival and ethnographic research and a close 
reading of Soviet texts, this article primarily traces a genealogy of the Soviet law on freedom 
of conscience freedom from religion until its post-1990 redefinition as a more conventional 
liberal notion of religious liberty. The legal reform of 1990 had brought about several dramatic 
conceptual effects. One of the most thought-provoking transformations was a collapse of two 
distinct conceptual categories of conscience and religion in Soviet literature into one 
undifferentiated notion of freedom of religious conviction. On the surface, this conceptual 
occlusion might appear as an innocuous effort to bring Russian laws in line with international 
legal frameworks and academic debates  about the primacy of religious or secular claims to 
freedom of conscience in the history of European human rights (e.g. Maclure and Taylor, 2011; 
Moyn 2015; Witte 2011). However, for Russian atheists, the conceptual conflation of 
conscience with religious liberty has not only recalibrated the atheists’ legal and political 
relations with the state but also effaced the specifically Soviet meanings of right and 
conscience in the Soviet law and ethics (e.g. Ivanov 1972). This conceptual effect, I aver, 
appears to obscure the links between atheism and its revolutionary past although, as Nikolai’s 
speech in the opening vignette shows, the political potential of atheist activism remains. 
First, I would like to give an ethnographic sense of the juridical marginality among 
Muscovite atheist activists. Second, I trace the genealogy of the Soviet law on freedom of 
conscience until its reform, initiated in the late 1980s. Here, the apprehension and confusion 
about the new law among expert Soviet atheists in 1990 was apparent during a momentous 
encounter (c.f. Goodale 2006) with the new law. Preserved as an archived transcript of the 
discussion of the reformed law, the document captures a sense of loss of the atheists’ 
ideological and political primacy and their equivocations about the omission of atheism from 
the definition of freedom of conscience and about the meaning of conscience per se. I tease 
out the theoretical implications of the revised law’s conceptual effect, namely the slippage 
between conscience and religious liberty, after I survey the most recent law on offending 
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religious feelings and its contribution to further marginalization of organized atheism, 
effectively making it an unlawful (if not outright illegal) pursuit in today’s Russia.  
A small room in a research institute. 
Overlooked by studies of religious revival and its limits in the post-Soviet Russia, the 
reversal of fortunes of organized atheism has been poorly understood. My effort to explore 
what has been left of the organized Soviet atheism in the present-day Moscow led me to a 
ramshackle research institute. Situated outside the Third Circular Road, it is not far from 
central Moscow but, to me, it seemed symbolically remote from the glitz of global fashion 
chains, Pain Quotidien cafes, Radisson hotels, and revamped, touristy sites near Kremlin and 
the Church of Christ the Saviour. In the third zone, many street scenes reminded of a less 
glamorous, worn-out capital city of the late eighties with neat elderly women and men selling 
handknitted woollen socks, cheap alarm clocks, and AA batteries on the steps of the Moscow 
metro.  The research institute itself was a prototype of the rationalized (Buchli 1997) post 
Stalinist architecture, with a functional concrete façade, large double-glazed windows, and 
heavy wooden doors, all painted russet. In its simplicity, it featured no ornamental excesses 
of Stalin’s classicist projects with their cornucopia of statues and columns.  
Behind the hefty double door, a security guard made a brief phone call to ascertain 
that I was expected and ushered me through a turnstile into a long concrete corridor flanked 
with two rows of tall wooden doors. One of them was opened by a slender middle-aged 
woman, Nina, who works as a secretary to an atheist organization that represents a vestige 
of the former confluence of atheism and socialism. The office was decorated with many 
identical portraits of Joseph Stalin and furnished with three heavy wooden desks, a few 
display bookcases with glass doors, and a green leather sofa on hefty wooden legs. Nina 
offered me some strong black tea and mainly complained about “the invasion of mugs” from 
Central Asia, “one can barely see a Russian face on the bus”iii.  
Nina worried about media reports of persecution and trials of some atheists. She 
mentioned the precarious legal status of her employer, which made her worried about the 
prospects of looking for a new job in her forties. She explained that their atheist organization 
was prevented from opening a business bank account to attract sponsors and funds for 
dissemination of the atheist worldview. Indeed, judging from internet traces and abandoned 
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blogs, humanist and atheist associations and minor oppositional political parties on a mission 
against ‘obscurantism and clericalism’ tend to be short-lived. In the absence of a legal body 
to champion their cause, atheist activism cannot be described as a social movement. The 
atheists I met in Moscow in 2017-2018 hold various philosophical and political views. For 
instance, some are nostalgically Marxists. Others despise the Soviet past and its legacy and 
prefer the self-description of ‘sensible’ thinkers, literally somebody of the sound mind 
(zdravomislyschie). An active member of the Committee against Pseudo-Science within the 
Academy of Scienceiv appeals to the philosophical values of Enlightenment and positivist, 
“rational” science while he espouses religious tolerance. One person is an active member of 
Asgardia, the first space nation that is evolving from a virtual utopia into a vibrant 
organizationv. These people know each other and convene low profile public events, such as 
round-table debates in local libraries; some of these events are filmed and uploaded on social 
networks. This seems to exhaust the range of their activities.  
During the three hours I had spent in the office with Nina, no one came in the room. 
There were no phone calls. Later, Nina facilitated a skype interview with Andreivi who 
introduced himself as the Chief Ideologue and a self-nominated spokesperson for Russian 
atheists. Andrei spoke about the lamentable political climate of clericalization that has 
witnessed the Russian Orthodox Church’s involvement in public affairs in presumed violation 
of the constitutionally guaranteed secularism in Russia.  Even though the Russian Orthodox 
Church endorses the differentiation between the spiritual and worldly domains, it is 
omnipresent in its efforts to assert its authority and educate rather lax Russian citizens in 
correct doctrine and practice (Ladykowska 2018). For instance, a new school subject on 
“Foundations of the spiritual and ethical culturevii of peoples of Russia” has been introduced 
in Russian schools with an explicit aim to instil children’s capacity for spiritual growth and 
moral self-perfectability as well as tolerance and respect for religious feelings or their 
absenceviii. The choice of terminology - ‘culture’ rather than faith - is significant as it 
demonstrates the Church’s overt commitment to legal secularism. However, for people like 
Andrei and many parents, teachers and children, the Church’s presence at schools connotes 
a thinly disguised effort to carry out re-evangelization of Russian citizens (Kollner 2016). Some 
suggest that 68% of Russian population oppose clericalization of the state (Richters 2014:20). 
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An hour into what I misconstrued as a promising interview, Andrei grew uneasy with 
my questions. He seemed particularly rattled by my inquiry if atheism in today’s Russia carried 
ethical or political connotations as it did in Soviet textbooks. Andrei felt that atheist ethics 
was a fascinating question but, perhaps, too philosophical for their purposes. He explained 
away the fact that his atheist organization shared the office with a minor communist party as 
a matter of convenience and intellectual similarities rather than a blatant declaration of 
political protest. He grew suspicious. Subsequently, he refused my requests to talk to him 
again, meet his associates, or attend their staff meetings and public events. Andrei’s caution 
and his disavowal of political intent are telling of a deep-seated sense of illegitimacy of 
organized atheism in Moscow. 
A historical note on atheism in Soviet Russia  
To fully grasp the setback of Soviet atheists, it is important to remember that, Soviet 
atheism was a privileged ideology although it had not been triumphant as a lived experience. 
In fact, only a small percentage of the Soviet Russian population declared themselves as active 
atheists, while most grew estranged from religious institutions, which prompted a debate 
about whether Soviet Russia exemplified ‘genuine’ atheism or a version of secularization 
(Laitila 2016:264). On the ground, militant atheism and “accelerated secularism” (Wanner 
2012:6) encountered civil disobedience, rumourmongering, threats of divine retribution, 
petition-writing and mass protests against the state-enforced atheism (Husband 1998). Soviet 
diaries contain narratives of disapproval of militant atheism, and its excesses such as 
detonated churches and other temples, murders, imprisonment and forced psychiatric 
treatment of thousands of Soviet clergy and believers. But private diaries also point to the 
limits of resistance as many people learned to casually accommodate Soviet revolutionary 
rituals with church attendanceix.  
The early Soviet antireligious campaigns were riddled with internal contradictions and 
conflicts between competing organizations. For example, the League of Militant Godless, the 
juggernaut of atheist propaganda in the 1920s, bickered with the Komsomol, a significantly 
more popular and comprehensive communist youth organization. The League suffered from 
a perennial lack of funds and shortages of propaganda materials and cadres (Peris 1998). It 
“receded to the point of invisibility in the mid-1930s” (ibid.:197). Atrocities of the Stalinist 
period and the short-lived religious revival during WWII, were followed by a mixed campaign 
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of neglect, ‘demystification’ and purportedly scientific propaganda against religion (Husband 
1998:79).  
 Nevertheless, the ritual life dwelt. For instance, the popularity of religious healing 
practices confounded the atheists’ expectations of the inevitable disappearance of religion 
(Husband 1998:76). In the 1960s, expert atheists and anti-religious activists made a concerted 
effort to understand the reasons for persistence of ‘backward religiosities’ and to develop 
methodologies for research and more refined forms of denunciation of religion (Luehrmann 
2015:1-2).  In the period between 1960 and 1989, the state funded ethnographic research 
into religious ‘remnants’ under the Soviet socialism, such as omnipresence of icons in people’s 
homes (Klimova and Molostova 2013:172-174). They built typologies of believers and atheists 
on a spectrum of active and passive involvement (ibid.:183-184). Soviet atheists and 
ethnographers aimed to expose inconsistencies between people’s faith, scientific knowledge, 
and everyday demeanour (ibid.) but their approach only underlined atheists’ own dogmatic 
understanding of lived religiosities that had come to incorporate visions of both socialist and 
religious utopia, afterlife and justice (Dobson 2015). 
Remarkably, the repressive anti-religious environment in the Soviet Union stimulated 
dynamic, syncretic and playful religiosities that morphed into more axiomatic and 
conservative religious movements after 1990 (Pelkmans 2014).  Another paradox is that the 
survival of religious practices under socialism hinted at the failure of atheist campaigns yet 
simultaneously provided evidence to a claim that Soviet socialism permitted ‘genuine’ 
religious liberty (Luehrmann 2015:10), which was formally enshrined in the Soviet law on 
freedom of conscience.  
Freedom of conscience as freedom from religion 
The Soviet law on freedom of conscience was codified by the revolutionary decree of 
January 23rd, 1918 (Gagarin 1962:10), that is, from the inception of the Soviet statehood. The 
Soviet definition of freedom of conscience evolved in opposition to the tsarist legal norms. A 
Russian pamphlet on freedom of conscience printed in 1917 provides a useful overview of 
what freedom of conscience meant on the eve of the Soviet Revolution, keeping in mind that 
religious liberty in political and intellectual discussions differed from a popular understanding 
of freedom of confession as ability to carry out rituals (Frede 2012:565, 573). The pamphlet’s 
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author (Shakhovskaia 1917) identified freedom of conscience as the right to openly practise 
and proselytise one’s religion and live in accord with one’s persuasions without fear of 
persecution (ibid.:4). The right was to be extended to all religious denominations, a radical 
step under the tsarist government that discriminated against some Christian ‘sectsx’ by giving 
the exclusive licence to proselytise to the Russian Orthodox Church (Poole 2012: 612-615).  In 
continuity with the intellectual debates among many 19th century Russian radicals, liberals 
and revolutionaries (Frede 2012:561), the Tsarist Duma tabled the amendments to the law to 
enforce a greater secularization of the state in 1906. Russian Social Democrats suggested 
radically that freedom of conscience could be conferred to atheists (Shakhovskaia 1917:16) 
but their proposals were not ratified.  
The Soviet revolutionary government postulated a polemical break with the tsarist 
past by prioritizing atheists and encouraging the dissemination of atheist ideas (Codevilla 
1991:130). Another Soviet pamphlet (Matjushin 1965) offers a historical review of the Soviet 
legislature that, according to the author, had materialized the ideals of pre-revolutionary 
intellectual elites by giving equal rights to the faithful and atheists and by separating the state 
and the church. The Soviet government handed administrative practices, such as the 
registration of birth and marriage, to the state. State subsidies to the church were abolished. 
Religious education was prohibited because the state pledged to protect all citizens, 
especially children, from the “soul-snatching” by the clergy (Gagarin 1962: 11). The Soviet law 
barred religious organizations from running charity funds (kassi vzaimopomoshchi), 
organizing excursions, opening playgrounds and libraries, leading children’s and women’s 
prayer meetings, organizing pilgrimages or performing miracles, healings, prophecies and so 
on. All these practices were described as a disturbance of public order. Thus, Article 124 of 
the first Soviet constitution and Article 52 of the 1977 Soviet constitution on non-
discrimination against the faithful were contradicted by other laws, such as the right to 
atheistic propaganda (Laitila 2016:266), which privileged atheist organizations. 
Unexpectedly, in separating the state and the church, the Soviet law on freedom of 
conscience concurred with what is dubbed a ‘liberal’ definition of religious freedom, namely 
freedom of individual conviction (Balzer 2011:260). For instance, Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 9 (1 and 2) of the European Convention on 
Human protect the inviolability of individual religiosity from coercion, bar permissible and 
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proportional intervention by the state to protect the public good (Renucci 2005: 7). These 
declarations are based on a normative split between sacrosanct forum internum and 
restricted forum externum, or manifest practice (Mahmood and Danchin 2014), which 
reiterates the meaning of religious liberty as a matter of individual convictionxi (Bhuta 
2014:14-16). In contrast to other human rights (like education, security, freedom of speech 
and others) that can be shared by religious and non-religious claimants, freedom of 
conscience tends to evoke tailor-made provisions to protect mainstream and minority 
religious traditions and institutions (e.g. Green 2011:7). To some extent, this view takes for 
granted the secular backdrop of human rights (Renucci 2005:30, 42; Sapir and Statman 
2005:479) and downplays possibilities of impairment of atheist conscience (Sapir and Statman 
2005: 469), especially since atheist conscience tends to be defined by an absence rather than 
an expression of conviction.  
In sum, the Leninist understanding of religion as a personal belief chimes with the 
regnant international interpretations of human rights as an innate attribute of a rational 
individual with inviolable interiority (Bhuta 2014:12; Slezkine 2014; Thomas 2001). However, 
the Soviet and international human rights law evolved from different ontological and ethical 
premises. The liberal law has been traced to the theological tradition of personalism (Bhuta 
2014:18) that stipulated individual freedom to “worship God in accordance with conscience” 
(Lindkvist 2013: 436). Rooted in Catholicism, freedom of conscience as a human right has 
been described as a conservative stance that offered the recognition of a transcendent, 
Godly, human dignity as a counterpoint to the unfreedoms of communism and socialism 
(Moyn 2015). Thus, the architecture of human rights was mounted as a “bulwark against the 
antidemocratic, materialist, and totalitarian propensities inherent in modern politics” (Bhuta 
2014:11), and adhered to a view of personhood as “the unencumbered self”, with the 
capacity to make independent decisions (Sandel 1998:85). And, although international law 
has lost a reference to God as a transcendental guarantor (van der Ven 2013:179), it is 
saturated with religious themes (Calo 2011). As a result, Maclure and Taylor (2011:95) have 
suggested that freedom of conscience exhibits a bias toward religious and metaphysical 
convictions.  
As a critique of the purported liberal bias toward religious convictions, the Soviet 
category of freedom of conscience was presented as a corrective and touted as a more 
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inclusive legal innovation from the start (Quigley 2007). Additionally, the Soviet law diverged 
from the legal understanding of right as a natural, inherent property of an individual. In the 
tsarist scheme of things, freedom of conscience was an ideal human value, while its 
protection was “a political virtue” (Poole 2012:618) rather than a ‘natural’ right. Its 
revolutionary successor did not recognize right as a capacity and substance of individuals, 
either (Werth 2012). In Caroline Humphrey’s perspicacious analysis, political membership in 
Soviet Russia involved “an entry into a privileged political state” (Humphrey 2007:2). By 
extension, human rights, including freedom of conscience, could only be realized through 
membership – frequently party membership - rather than treated as inherent and automatic 
(Nathans 2011:169). Within Soviet legality, rights had to be earned via labour (ibid.:177); they 
did not connote immunity but entitlement, or privilege, that could be bestowed or stripped 
away (ibid.:170, 177). Hence, human rights were linked to political membership, making 
marginality, exile and estrangement into spaces of dissent (c.f. Boym 1996; Yurchak 2005). 
Simply, the Soviet version of the law on freedom of conscience was elaborated to 
explicitly foreground and promote the rights of atheists while the notion of right was a 
conceptual corollary of political entitlement and belonging.  
“Call it freedom of conscience” 
To repeat, the Soviet law on freedom of conscience was proffered as an inclusive legal 
framework that guaranteed the right to private religious conviction and the political right to 
freedom from religion. In practice, the state gave primacy to atheism. Thus, when in October 
1990, the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union proposed a reform of the law “On Freedom of 
conscience and religious organizations”, the motion came as a shock to one of my 
interlocutors. On 22-24th of November, 1990, the Znanie Society, then the leading atheist 
organization, convened a seminarxii to discuss the content and ramifications of the draft law. 
At the beginning of the seminar, the Chair of the Znanie greeted its members, mainly 
specialists in Soviet atheist education, propaganda, and Marxist-Leninist ethics, with the 
following words: “Comrades-atheists! Atheist propaganda is not what it used to be. Nobody 
needs atheism today (segodnia, ateizm – eto nikomu ne nuzhno).  Maybe it needs to be 
abandoned altogether, although this sounds extreme. Anyhow, the draft law on freedom of 
conscience sets a new agenda for us”. 
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The first speaker, Boris Fedorovich, wistfully explained that adherents to the scientific-
atheist worldview could hardly see the light of day in press, which made it necessary to 
register an official humanist or atheist organization. The second speaker described the 
contemporary relations between the state and the church in the newly democratic society as 
flirting with religion and a gradual politicization of religion in the Soviet Union, evident in the 
emergence of Muslim parties in some Soviet Republics.  
The third speaker, Victor Serafimovich, focused on the legal terminology. He pointed 
out that, in drafting the law, the category ‘conscience’ was used interchangeably with religion 
or religious belief, in other words, in its legal sense. Victor Serafimovich offered a definition 
of freedom of conscience as “the right to freely choose or not a religious belief or conviction, 
act upon this conviction, and manifest it openly, publicly or privately”. Victor Serafimovich 
mentioned an unofficial UN document that highlighted equality between religious believers 
and non-believers as a matter of security and equality. 
Victor Serafimovich explained that the legal category subsumed different rights. 
However, “something” (chto-to) had been left out. He argued that a shared meaning of 
‘conscience’ as a principle of Marxist ethics (c.f. Thompson 2014) did not reflect the legal 
definition of conscience as religion. “I brought the topic up during consultations on the new 
law, but the Chair hushed me down and told me not mention ‘that something’”, he 
complained.  
Without giving references, he reminded that, from a philosophical point of view, 
freedom of conscience meant freedom from “religious intoxication” (religioznogo durmana).  
“This definition was used against the Soviet Union, because “, Victor Serafimovich’s voice 
seemed to have acquired sarcastic intonations, “atheists’ objectives were mis-represented as 
a single-minded elimination of religion”.  In his view, it was a misconception because Article 
52 of the Soviet Constitution referred to freedom of conscience as an individual right, 
although not the institutional right of the Church. “I mentioned this to our Patriarch”, said 
Victor Serafimovich almost defiantly. “According to Lenin, religion is a private matter 
(chastnoe delo)”.  
To Victor Serafimovich, the definition of religion as a matter of interiority justified 
early Soviet militant actions against religious institutions and reconciled them with the 
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constitutional pledge to respect individual religiosities. In other words, the Party battled with 
institutional religion (vedet borbu) through scientific methods and control of registration of 
new religious organizations.  
“What a muddle”, sighed Victor Serafimovich.  
In the end, he clarified, atheism as the right not to have religion was implied by the 
category of freedom of conscience, even if religious organizations were placed in a privileged 
position. “Strange”, continued Victor Serafimovich, “in the Soviet days, we assumed 
everything was shipshape in the country. We refused to see violations of the rights of 
believers”. Victor Serafimovich carried on, “In the 60s there was a lot of coercion 
(prinuzhdenie) because it was called the transition strategy (strategiia perehoda). It seemed 
obvious that communism would reign supreme in the 1980s. When we proposed a new 
amendment to the freedom of conscience law in 1965, we were criticized because we 
shattered the impression that everything was perfect in the Soviet Union. The timing of the 
proposal coincided with renewed pressure on the Church, so the law was debunked. 
Currently, we are criticized because we see something positive in the Soviet law.” 
Victor Serafimovich’s report was followed by a brief Q&A session. Someone in the 
audience shouted: “What about us, atheists? What about our right to conduct atheist 
propaganda and assert our own conception of freedom of conscience?” 
One of the speakers responded that the prevailing mood in the Supreme Council was 
to strike out the Soviet past and ignore the freedom of atheist conscience. “Freedom of 
atheist conscience is not guaranteed by law but we thought why stipulate everything by law? 
What is not prohibited is permitted, right? Atheist propaganda will not be financed by the 
state but it will not interfere or restrict the dissemination of scientific findings. The Church is 
worried about this and seeks to get involved in school education.  Nevertheless, it was 
unpleasant to watch a news clip about tearing down the plaque from the Kazan Cathedralxiii 
and declaring the end of atheism (konets ateizma). Call it freedom of conscience!” 
Two interconnected themes in Victor Serafimovich’s presentation strike me as 
noteworthy: his experience of the loss of atheist privileges incurred by the revised law and 
his opposition to the blurring of the distinction between religious liberty and conscience. The 
former once again refers to the historical genealogy of the Soviet Russian law on freedom of 
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conscience, the key point of this essay. The latter signifies an additional dimension, a subtle 
conceptual effect of the legal changes that Victor Serafimovich intuited but did not fully 
elaborate. 
Victor Serafimovich’s muted equivocations about the meaning of ‘conscience’ in the 
legal definition of the law on freedom of conscience is important because it gestures towards 
an inherent ambiguity of freedom of conscience as an imperative for religious and moral (my 
emphasis) freedom, with or without a transcendental moral standard (Perry 2014:127). The 
Soviet atheism was theorized not only as an absence of belief but as an ethico-political 
alternative to religion as it brought together a variety of spiritual and ethical concerns such 
as “the meaning of life, happiness and solace, the moral and immoral in human behaviour, 
truth and conscience, good and evil, the upbringing of children, the preservation of traditions, 
and how to understand contemporary events” (Smolkin-Rothrock 2014:176). Simply, Soviet 
atheism challenged the authority of the Church that saw religion as a regnant source of 
morality (c.f. Lambek 2012; Robbins 2015) by proffering an alternative system of socialist 
ethics, with conscience as its core value. 
Conscience was a contentious term for Soviet thinkers who denied its divine origins 
(Matjushin 1965). The Russian Orthodox Church recognized (and still does) conscience as a 
“spark of God” within a person (Zigon 2009: 8), a divine imperative (Agadjanian 2010:100). 
Contrary to the theological axioms, Soviet atheism was rooted in a notion of conscience as a 
moral duty (Stoeckl 2014:58; Bruning 2014:30). Soviet writers objected that if Christian 
conscience was a conduit for divine judgment and God’s will (Matjushin 1965:7), the 
proposition implied God’s superiority to humankind and entailed a kind of diminution of 
human agency (Zagorulko 1968). In contrast to the allegedly bleak Christian cosmos (Kon 
1960:16-17), Soviet atheism propagated a humanistic ideology (Grinberg 1975:136) oriented 
towards enrichment of intellectual life (obogoschenije intellektualnoj sferi) (Furov 1983: 19) 
and maturation of human creative capacities (Ehlen 1973:203). Thus, atheism and cultivation 
of communist conscience as a secular moral principle were entwined as necessary aspects of 
political and human emancipation (Marx 1977 [1843]:63) from nature and religious moralism. 
To rephrase, the Soviet conception of atheism was linked to conscience as a political register 
and an “ideological commitment” (Engelke 2015:76) that systematically elaborated the 
premises of a secular communist morality (Wielenberg 2013).  
14 
 
So far I have argued that the reforms of the law on freedom of conscience undermined 
atheists’ privileged institutional and ideological status. However, the new law has also 
conflated two previously distinct categories of conscience as a secular moral principle and 
religion as an individual conviction into one underspecified notion of freedom of conscience, 
in a greater accord with international law. As a result, the reforms have performed a double 
task of marginalising atheist organizations and of obscuring a secular meaning of conscience 
as an ethico-political foundation of critique. 
Freedom of conscience after 1990 
 Victor Serafimovich could not have anticipated the scale of juridical marginality of 
atheist organizations 30 years later.  Initially, the 1990 draft law on freedom of conscience 
confirmed Soviet citizens’ rights to profess religious beliefs or not to profess any without 
hindrance or discrimination. It reasserted the right to individual religious liberty (Sakwa 1996) 
but bestowed new freedoms to some religious organizations. From 1990, religious 
organizations could register as legal entities and acquired new rights such as setting up 
schools, visiting prisons and military hospitals, owing some property, and freely distributing 
religious literaturexiv. The ban on religious political parties was upheld in line with the meaning 
of ‘secular’ in this context. However, the Russian Orthodox Church criticized the early version 
of the law for failing to define ‘a religious organization’, to grant tax exemptions, and to 
provide state pensions to its priests. In their view, the state remained ambivalent about 
freedom of religious institutions and was inclined toward the understanding of religion as a 
potential source of violence (Berman, Griswold and Newman 1990:145).  
 Further amendments were implemented in 1997 and, since then, have been assessed 
as more restrictive (Hallinan 2012:310-311). Overtly, the law pledges non-intervention into 
religious matters (Antonov and Samokhina 2015:231). Consistently with Article 14 of the 1993 
Russian Constitution on the secularity of the state, courts have adopted the definition of 
religion as a personal choice and conviction. However, some judges have demonstrated an 
increasing propensity to side with so-called traditional religions, especially the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ibid.:234). The preferential treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church has 
been coached in secular terms of the necessity to manage religious diversity in a multi-ethnic 
state (Balzer 2011:251), which evinces a preoccupation with the matters of national security 
and extremism.  
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However, a curious incident at the conceptual art exhibition Forbidden Art in 2007 
highlights a hardening of the official attitudes towards critique and irreverent attitudes to the 
Church and religions. The notorious exhibition featured an icon made of black caviar, a 
Muslim woman in a burqa with a lifted skirt, a crucified Jesus with a superimposed profile of 
Lenin and many other works of conceptual art. For their deliberate provocation, the artists 
were charged with inciting religious hatred (Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code) and 
violating the rights of the faithful (Bernstein 2014:429, 436). The ‘scandal’ made the headlines 
although the content of the exhibition is in no way extraordinary as the Russian Orthodox 
Church is frequently mocked in online chatrooms, forums, and social networks. Social media 
posts contain jibes that the membership in the Russian Orthodox Church is a fence for corrupt 
business activities, “nothing but selling candles”. Many comments openly insult Orthodox 
priests as paedophiles, professional liars, advocates of religious hatred and intolerance, and, 
simply, spongers. However, such parodies and memes of religious persons and events have 
increasingly become risky statements. 
 In 2013, the Russian Duma passed a law on offending religious feelings, that has been 
nicknamed the “Blasphemy Law” (Laitila 2016:280). From August 2017, ‘blasphemy’ can be 
punished by fines, and even a prison sentence under the new Law 148 of the Russian Criminal 
Code. For instance, in 2017, a young man who was detained for chasing a Pokémon in a church 
in Ekaterinburg, was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison. Between 2013 and 2018, at least 15 
suspended prison sentences were meted out. A 23-year old woman and a 19-year old man 
are currently on trial for their online satirical sketches of the Christian faithxv. Curiously, the 
word ‘blasphemy’ is not mentioned in the law itself. The nickname both occludes and 
indicates that the “Blasphemy Law” goes beyond a legal regulation of the state relations with 
the Church as it marks a confluence of religious, ethical, political and historiographic 
narratives. For instance, the above court cases appear on many human rights websites in 
Moscow as they tangle questions of free-thinking (svobodomyslie), freedom of speech, 
censorship, civic freedoms and human rights, as well as justice and state accountability.  
For human rights activists and atheists, the Blasphemy laws embody an intimate 
relation between the Church and the state, known as symphonia. It must be said that 
symphonia is a “limited cooperation” (Wasmuth 2014:18) as the Russian Orthodox Church 
and the state have a divergent understanding of authority. For example, the Russian Orthodox 
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Church was reprimanded by the state for the theological justification of permissible resistance 
as the will of conscience against the state (ibid.:19)xvi. Nevertheless, the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Russian state are seen as collaborators: the church bestows moral legitimacy 
to the state in return for the state’s protection of the Russian Orthodox religion (Blazer 
2016:267; Hallinan 2012). Although compatible with international law, such as Strasburg 
jurisprudence, the Russian law prioritizes Russian heritage and ‘traditional Russian’ 
religiositiesxvii (Hallinan 2012), which means that, effectively, the law gives preference to the 
Russian Orthodox Church over local minority religions and newer foreign religious 
organizations and missionaries. From 2006, the law on freedom of conscience has been 
intertwined with anti-extremist legislature that cites incitement of religious hatred as a threat 
to national security (ibid.:315-316). 
In addition to new legal frameworks that privilege the Russian Orthodox Church, the 
state and the Russian Orthodox Church agree on the constitutive values of unity and harmony 
over plurality (Wasmuth 2014:19). Thus, the state-church alliance serves an ideological 
function of promoting an idea of Russia’s ethno-historical ‘samobitnost’, or the country’s 
distinctiveness, that has replaced many Soviet ideologies, not least atheism. The overarching 
state ideology charts a ‘unique’ Russian identity, distinct from foreign values (Horvath 2016). 
Both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state deploy the academic notions of 
‘civilization’ and ‘civilization clash’ (ibid.:874) in their defence of cultural pluralism and 
specificity of Russian history and Russian national identity. Bluntly put, the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Russian state have been making a case for cultural relativity (c.f. Cruft 2005). 
Consequential for atheist activists is the commonplace assumption that the new 
civilizational narratives about Russian tradition and heritage hang on a stark contrast between 
values and rights. In fact, the 2006 document titled the Declaration of the Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being was collaboratively penned by the Church and the state to argue that 
‘traditional values’ such as faith, morality and Russian sovereignty are not only equivalent to 
human rights,  they have to be protected from the “corrosive effects of rights” (Horvath 
2016:880-881). And although the state and the Church have accepted the language of human 
rights, both have rejected the idea of universal human rights in favour of culture-specific and 
traditional values (Horsfjord 2012: 432). In 2009, the Russian Orthodox Church succeeded in 
passing a resolution on traditional values at the United Nations Human Rights Council. The 
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resolution and other documents written by the Church pursue a line of reasoning that 
Western or liberal human rights embody a “secular ideology” (ibid.:436) that is incompatible 
with the traditional teachings of the Church in its emphasis on collective duties to its 
homeland and purity from sinxviii. By extension, both oppose the allegedly immoral liberal 
secularism (Bruning 2014:29). As mentioned earlier, even such high-profile Soviet 
Enlightenment organization as Znaniexix has switched its propaganda focus from 
dissemination of atheist propaganda to cultivation of historical consciousness as a form of 
patriotismxx (Laruelle 2015), love of homeland, respect for cultural heritage, and so-called 
traditional values in a growing propensity toward insular Russian nationalism.  
Conclusion  
So, where does this leave atheist activists?  
Three protagonists of this essay have linked their sense of juridical marginality to the 
reforms of the Russian law on freedom of conscience. I have traced the complex genealogy 
of this law from its Soviet formulation as freedom from religion to its subsequent redefinition 
as religious liberty. I have paid attention to the deeper logic of right that has shifted its 
meaning from right as privileged membership to right as a corollary of traditional values and 
to the loss of political meaning of conscience as a premise of Soviet atheist ethics. I have 
argued that the reformed law on freedom of conscience has generated a peculiar conceptual 
effect of collapsing conscience and religion into one undifferentiated legal category. 
For the protagonists of this essay, atheism was (and remains) first and foremost a 
political right to criticise the perceived intimate relation between the Russian state and the 
Church. Although contemporary atheists haven’t explicitly theorized their dissent in relation 
to the revolutionary trope of secular conscience, their claims to inclusion into the legal rubric 
of freedom of conscience resonate with the human rights scholarship that attempts to 
conceptualise conscience as a secular space for “political freedom, a real limit on 
government” (Domingo 2015:177). In case of Muscovite atheist activists, the omission of 
conscience from the repertoire of political dissent suggests that collapsing religion and 
conscience has ended up depoliticizing some forms and registers of protest (Douzinas 
2007:102). Nevertheless, despite the fact that conscience as religious freedom is not what it 
used to be in Soviet pamphlets, claims to freedom of conscience go beyond a contestation of 
18 
 
their juridical marginality as they revive certain historical associations of atheism with an 
alternative revolutionary ethic. Keeping in mind the political nature of atheism in Russia, 
these claims and associations harbour a moment of “embryonic critique” (Li 2019:29) of the 
conservative political order that naturalizes Russian ‘identity’ into “unalterable 
characteristics” (Greenawalt 2016:313) and foregrounds tradition, stabilityxxi, and order 
(Carnaghan 2007) as its constitutive values. 
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i All names have been changed. 
ii I quote his presentation with a few omissions but without changing the order or meaning of his arguments. 
Most omissions have to do with Nikolai’s thanks, for example, to Moscow transhumanists and character 
descriptions of his teachers and colleagues as honest people, consistent (posledovatelnij) in their atheism. 
iii I did not call out Nikolai and Nina’s racism. However, a confluence of atheism and racism, especially 
Islamophobia, is fairly common in Russia and elsewhere (Moyn 2014).  
iv An astronomer, this person is concerned with a proliferation of healing rituals and home remedies that are 
not supported by scientific evidence. He was one of ten signatories to an open letter to the Russian president 
in June, 2007 that protested against the introduction of theological subjects and creation theories in state 
schools. In the letter, the scientists argued that science (nauka) was the only factually verifiable discipline in 
the constitutionally secular state with the majority atheist population. 
v https://asgardia.space/en/ 
vi I have deliberately changed all personal names to protect the identity of my interlocutors. Ditto, I do not 
want to disclose the names of their organizations.  
vii The term ‘culture’ is used in a manner that both essentializes Russian reality and justifies different political 
and social policies . 
viii The Letter of the Ministry of Education about learning of religious and secular ethics and about spiritual 
culture of the Soviet peoples. (Pismo Minobrnauki Rossii ) 25.05.2015 г. № 08-761  
Online access: http://mosmetod.ru/metodicheskoe-prostranstvo/nachalnaya-shkola/inklyuzivnoe-
obrazovanie/normativno-pravovaya-dokumentatsiya/pismo-minobrnauki-rossii-ot-25-05-2015-g-08-761-ob-
izuchenii-predmetnykh-oblastej-osnovy-relig.html 
ix I have relied on the digital diaries held at www.prozhito.org. Diaries are transcribed and published online 
with minimal editing.  
x The attitude has persisted throughout the Soviet era until today in relation to ‘baptists’, especially Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. 
xi Alternatively, it can be indigenized as a matter of ‘culture’ to articulate political claims to autonomy (Sapir 
and Statman 2005:468). 
xii GARF (Russian State Archive), 10100 2 1432 
xiii Indeed, the Kazan Cathedral in Leningrad (St Petersburgh) (Paine 2009) was iconic of the downfall of 
atheism. The Cathedral hosted the Museum of the History of Atheism from 1932 until 1990 but was shut down 
to resume its original religious functions in 1992.. 
xiv www.prilib.ru The Presidential Library of Russia. 
xv https://pen-international.org/news 
 
xvii The law is biased against so-called religious sects and religious new-comers such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
xviii To a large extent, the Church’s objection to human rights echoes the above-mentioned historical studies of 
the genealogy of human rights and anthropological suspicion of its ontological essentialism.  
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xix In the period between the end of the Second World War and the late 1980s, Znanie trained thousands of 
experts and activists and delivered millions of lectures on atheism and scientific worldview.  It was closed in 
2017 to re-open as a patriotic organization that disseminates an understanding of Russian culture, history and 
its values. It continues to deliver public lectures and organizes various educational events including seminars 
on popular science and history. Its explicit values are education and consolidation of patriotic attitudes and 
interethnic unity in Russia. Znanie leads a campaign against false science and false history.  See, 
www.znanierussia.ru  
xx Marlene Laruelle (2015) argues that patriotism in Russia is an umbrella term that covers multiple forms of 
historical affiliation to the state and practices of self-cultivation as a patriot. She uses an example of diverse 
youth clubs whose patriotic engagement focuses on differents periods and aspect of Russian history (the 
Soviet past, pre-revolutionary past, Orthodox religion.  
 
